By Derechos Digitales
Una versión en castellano del reporte está disponible aquí.
Introduction
The purpose of this report is to share an overview of the current human rights situation in Nicaragua, as it relates to digital technologies. We will focus on the events that have taken place since 2018, a year in which huge public protests and demonstrations took place, followed in turn by a strong governmental reaction.
As we will explore below, in the face of the complex political context in the country, in which the executive branch concentrates the power and control over state institutions and the population[1], digital environments have represented a space for disputes. On the one hand, the Internet has been a privileged vehicle for human rights defenders and journalists, both inside and outside Nicaragua, to disseminate information and denounce abuses, even to the international community. On the other hand, these people have been targets of censorship, repression and harassment by governmental entities, legitimized by abusive regulations.
The analysis of the implications of the context of human rights violations in the digital sphere is crucial to understand the closing process of the Nicaraguan civic space in recent years, so we hope that this report will serve as an input to international human rights organizations and authorities.
The text is based on the review of secondary sources of information, as well as some interviews with activists close to the local context. It is divided into three sections. In the first one, we will explore the human rights situation in Nicaragua, identifying the main regulatory frameworks that have criminalized the conduct of human rights defenders, journalists and political opposition to the government. In the second section, we will present the main tendencies regarding the violation of rights and their link with digital technologies. Finally, we will analyze the context faced by independent media.
Regulatory framework applicable to the digital environment
After the series of major social protests occurred in Nicaragua in 2018 and the violent reaction of the Government, the rates of human rights violations have increased in the country[2]. In those mobilizations, 76 people were reported killed and 868 injured, according to the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (IACHR), in addition to a series of arbitrary detentions[3]. State repression was combined with measures to legitimize such actions. In a period of five years, a legislative framework has been consolidated giving the Government powers to censor, repress and condemn citizens, journalists, the media, human rights defenders and civil society organizations.
The civic space has been significantly stifled due to legislations that impose administrative measures on civil society organizations, operating as barriers to limit the work and legal permanence of such institutions in the country. This has resulted in the cancellation of the legal status of 2,634 organizations between 2018 and 2022, according to data from the Office of the Special Rapporteur for Freedom of Expression (SRFOE) of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (IACHR), which states that “95% of them would have been cancelled in 2022” (SRFOE, 2023, p.299).
The regulatory frameworks underpinning these acts are the Law on the Regulation of Foreign Agents[4] and the General Law for the Regulation and Control of Non-Profit Organizations[5], both of which have been publicly rejected by international and regional human rights mandates due to their impact on the right to free association and others[6].
As denounced by local organizations, these legal frameworks have been used by the government to legitimize systematic practices of threats and harassment against social organizations and actors. According to a dossier[7] presented by the collectives Fundación del Río, Popol Na, Asociación Red Local and Esfera Ciudadana, among the forms of harassment is the arbitrary confiscation of offices and buildings in which these organizations and media outlets operate. In the same dossier, it is recognized that public authorities, especially the Ministry of governance (MIGOB), set up administrative barriers to the organizations’ requests to obtain the necessary certifications to operate. The government exercises political violence against these actors, criminalizing those who are members of social organizations.
On the other hand, the approval of the Law for the Defense of the People’s Rights to Independence, Sovereignty and Self-Determination for Peace, in December 2020, has represented a serious attack on freedom of expression. The law establishes a series of legal figures that can lead to the criminalization of a person for being considered a “traitor to the homeland” or for promoting “the undermining of independence, sovereignty, and self-determination”[8]. The ambiguous language in which this regulation is written has allowed the imprisonment of political opponents, activists, journalists and other actors critical to the government.
According to specialized organizations, persons detained for political reasons in Nicaragua, arrested for alleged crimes such as undermining sovereignty and self-determination, must endure deplorable conditions in prisons, which violate various human rights[9], including the right to life. SRFOE’s 2021 report notes cases of prisoners who have resorted to hunger strikes in the face of the authorities’ refusal to allow them to see their families[10].
This same law was an instrument of repression in the context of the presidential elections in 2021. Different individuals who announced their interest in running for the presidency were arrested for the crime of undermining sovereignty and money laundering. Some cases that illustrate this situation are that of Cristiana Chamorro[11], daughter of the former president of the country, and Miguel Mora Barberena[12], who was director of an independent media outlet.
Both announced their intention to pursue candidacy and were subsequently arrested. Between May and October 2021, the authorities arbitrarily detained seven presidential candidates and 32 recognized critics of the Government[13], thus eliminating electoral competition to ensure the maintenance in power of President Daniel Ortega.
In light of this situation, many international and regional organizations, including the IACHR, have called on the Nicaraguan government to improve conditions in prisons and detention centers, as well as to release political prisoners[14]. After the pressure exerted, the Nicaraguan government released 222 people[15] in U.S. territory, who had to sign a consent form to leave Nicaragua. Although this meant obtaining their freedom, it also implied that the Nicaraguan government intended to take away their nationality and leave them in stateless status, which has been denounced by human rights organizations[16], as it would mean violating the right to a nationality.
The Special Law on Cybercrime[17], passed in 2020 in the pre-election context, has also served to silence political dissent in the country. In particular, it has worked as a tool to threaten and imprison activists and journalists for the crime of “disseminating false news” through information and communication technologies in order to maintain control of the public debate through digital media[18].
The censorship and silencing of critical voices by the Government affected even those who criticized the authorities’ management of the pandemic, especially health professionals and journalists, who were accused by Vice President Rosario Murillo of spreading false news and instilling “health terrorism”, disseminating “false predictions and false surveys” and were threatened with arrest[19]. It is worth mentioning that the information disseminated by health personnel referred to the number of cases treated and deaths due to the disease, in disagreement with official governmental numbers[20].
Given this scenario, in 2021, the IACHR Rapporteur for Freedom of Expression stated: “the evidence compiled by the Rapporteur’s Office has led to the conclusion that there are currently no guarantees whatsoever for the exercise of the right to freedom of expression in the country” (SRFOE, 2022, p.220), reiterating this in his 2022 report.
Legislation framework that infringes on human rights in Nicaragua
Law No. 1115 on Regulation and Control of Non-Profit Organizations (NPOs), dated March 31, 2022 and Regulations to Law No. 1115 on Regulation and Control of Non-Profit Organizations (NPOs), dated February 16, 2023.
Institutionalizing persecution
According to civil society organizations, this legislation seeks to institutionalize political persecution against Non-Profit Organizations (NPOs)[21], as it has a series of administrative measures that constitute barriers to their operation and permanence in the country. The legislation’s text is ambiguous and allows for broad interpretation by the authorities, especially the Ministry of Governance, through the General Directorate for Registration and Control of Non-Profit Organizations, giving it the ability to limit the operation of NPOs.
Interference with NPO activities
The legislation allows government interference in the operation of NPOs through different articles. For example, in its Article 10 numeral 12, the General Directorate for Registration and Control of Non-Profit Organizations is allowed to implement evaluations to identify “vulnerabilities” of NPOs “against financing of terrorism, money laundering or other forms of support for terrorism and organized crime.” The measure allows a direct administrative interference of the Government towards non-profit organizations, diminishes their decision-making power and leads to the implementation of financial restrictions, since the receipt of financing is subject to approval by the General Directorate. The legislation is not clear in defining what such “vulnerabilities” are and what they look like, allowing discretionary interpretation by the government.
On the other hand, Article 10, paragraph 17 allows the Directorate to “intervene the NPOs administratively when necessary in accordance with the provisions set forth in this Law”. Meanwhile, paragraph 18 grants the Directorate the authority to “authorize new NPO projects.” Once again, these measures take away the NPOs’ decision-making power over the institutions’ work, giving the government greater possibilities to control the activities they carry out. With this action, the government appropriates the civic space, using the social sector to pursue its own interests.
Moreover, Article 11 determines a percentage for hiring foreigners: “Associations may have up to twenty-five percent (25%) of members of other nationalities with current residence in Nicaragua.” Despite appearing to be a merely administrative or human resources management issue, this indicates a direct intervention in the NPOs, which should have internal freedom and self-management.
Bureaucracy and cancellation of legal status
Throughout Law 115, it is possible to identify a series of broad administrative requirements that national and non-national NPOs must comply with in order to officially register (Chapter IV and Chapter V). This implies a series of bureaucratic hurdles that imply a long process in order to consolidate in the country, which can significantly limit the growth of the NPO sector at the national level, as well as its permanence and sustainability, having an impact on the reduction of the actors that interact in the civic space and hindering an organized critique of the government.
In turn, Article 34 establishes as an obligation for NPOs to report to the General Directorate “the pre-reporting of national and foreign donations of funds, goods or any object of value coming from natural or legal persons and to comply with the requirements established by current legislation in all matters related to the receipt of donations”. Although transparency of organizations is important in order to create a framework of trust on their work – in a scenario of scrutiny and persecution of NPOs by the government – instead of being an accountability tool, this report becomes one more mechanism of abusive control and is used to limit donations to the social sector.
Now, one of the most dangerous prohibitions established by the law, in Article 35, is that of “Using the organizational structure to violate public order, promote destabilization campaigns in the country, supporting, facilitating and inciting the affectation of citizen security and the legitimate exercise of the human rights of Nicaraguan families”. Due to the nature of the article, it leaves an open door for the Government to determine what type of actions can be considered “campaigns to destabilize the country”, as there are no guidelines to clarify it. In fact, this article has been used as an argument for the cancellation of the legal status of several NPOs.
As a result of the implementation of this law, the legal status of 2,634 civil society organizations has been cancelled between 2018 and 2022, according to data provided by the SRFOE.
Law No. 1055 for the Defense of the People’s Rights to Independence, Sovereignty and Self-Determination for Peace, dated December 21, 2020
Ambiguous wording allows arbitrariness
This law, made up of only two articles, stipulates a series of provisions that consolidate a person as a “traitor to the homeland.” Some of the actions contemplated by the law are: “altering the constitutional order;” carrying out “acts that undermine independence, sovereignty and self-determination;” “organizing with the funding of foreign powers to carry out acts of terrorism and destabilization;” “exalting and applauding the imposition of sanctions against the State” or “harming the supreme interests of the nation.”
This legislation is not explicit in cataloguing each of the above-mentioned actions to consider a person as a “traitor to the homeland,” which allows the Government to interpret the law at its convenience to repress any form of dissent. Since the approval of the law, several people have been prosecuted and imprisoned without following due process, thus allowing for arbitrariness on the part of the authorities.
Criminalizing to eliminate political competition
Law 1055 establishes: “all those who harm the supreme interests of the nation contemplated in the legal system, shall be ‘Traitors to the Homeland’ for which reason they shall not be eligible for elected office.” On the basis of such a measure, it was possible for the Government to eliminate the electoral competition in 2021, since, as mentioned above, seven pre-candidates were arrested, most of them accused of undermining the integrity and sovereignty, so they could not run for public office.
The one favored was the government of President Daniel Ortega, who remained in power, even though the electoral process was widely questioned. The Organization of American States (OAS) declared: “On November 7, 2021, Nicaragua held elections in the framework of a process that did not comply with any of the essential elements of democracy described in the Inter-American Democratic Charter” (OAS, 2021, p.1). Prior to the approval of the law, the OAS had already emphasized to the Nicaraguan government that this law was seen as an instrument designed to restrict political rights and to be benefited in the electoral competition[22].
Law 1042 Special Law on Cybercrime, dated October 27, 2020
Criminalization of online expression and limitation of the right to access information
The “catalog” of crimes imposed by the Cybercrime Law is not clear in explaining each of them. According to civil society organizations, the government’s bet has been to criminalize ordinary behaviors on the Internet[23]. The measures are in direct opposition to international recommendations, including from international authorities on freedom of expression, which specifically addressed the issue of the dissemination of fake news[24].
According to the law, there are four types of crimes: a) Crimes Related to the Integrity of Computer Systems; b) Computer Crimes; c) Computer Crimes Related to the Content of Data; and d) Computer Crimes Related to Sexual Freedom and Integrity.
Although multiple articles are of concern, for the purposes of this investigation the following ones stand out: Article 22 establishes the crime of “Impersonation and appropriation of computer identity,” which implies that “Whoever impersonates or appropriates the computer identity of a natural or legal person by means of Information and Communication Technologies, shall be sentenced to three to five years of imprisonment and two hundred to five hundred days [of] a fine.” Some organizations have considered this a danger, as a person could be arrested for creating or disseminating “memes and even parody accounts of public figures,”[25] which can lead to “the outlawing of parody and satire.”[26]
Article 28 establishes the crime of “threats through Information and Communication Technologies,” in which numeral 2 is of great concern, as it punishes “making imputations against honor or prestige, violating or disclosing secrets, with prejudice to him, his family, other persons with whom he is related, or entity he represents or in which he has an interest.” This does not clarify what happens when statements are made against public officials, who are subject to scrutiny and accountability. It also allows the authorities to interpret a news item about a public official as discrediting. This crime is punishable with between two and four years of imprisonment. In addition, this same numeral establishes that if the threat is aimed at “frightening the inhabitants of a population, ethnic, cultural or religious group, social group or any other group of persons and they have the necessary capacity to achieve it” the penalty would be from 4 to 6 years.
While it is necessary to recognize the importance of protecting groups potentially subject to discriminatory speech and hate speech, such measures should meet strict criteria determined by the international human rights system. In this case, the measure becomes more dangerous, in a context in which the authorities consider legitimate criticism as one kind of attack.
Meanwhile, the crime most frequently used by the Government to imprison opponents, activists and journalists is found in Article 30, which punishes the “Propagation of false news through Information and Communication Technologies.” Through this provision, expression and opinions are criminalized and self-censorship through digital media, such as social networks, is encouraged.
This ‘crime’ is punished with a sentence of two years in case it produces fear or anxiety in the population, and up to five years in prison when it endangers “the economic stability, public order, public health or sovereign security” of the country. This article was widely used by the government during the Covid pandemic to threaten health personnel for expressing an opinion on the management of the health crisis and to avoid criticism.
Surveillance
Chapter VI Procedure, Precautionary and Procedural Measures establishes surveillance measures. Article 38 determines that in order to prosecute a crime, measures such as “1. The seizure and deposit of computer systems or data storage devices. 2. The sealing, taping and prohibition of the use of computer systems or data storage devices. 3. The requirement of immediate preservation of data held by third parties. 4. The copying of data” may be requested. Without providing further clarification on the need to collect such data in order to prove a crime, it also does not classify when this is necessary and in what type of crimes it applies. This article could even be interpreted as the possibility of seizing a computer system or devices if a person spreads false news, which is a disproportionate measure.
The above provision is complemented by Article 39, which determines that, in order to carry out any of the previous actions, it is necessary to request judicial authorization “by any Criminal District Judge, upon a duly substantiated request by the National Police or the Public Prosecutor’s Office.” However, the interpretation of this article may be determined by the authorities, as it does not establish what “duly substantiated” means.
These articles not only contemplate the possibility of extracting and storing personal information contained in computer systems, but they also legalize State surveillance. The authorities have the possibility, through a judicial authorization from any Criminal District Judge, to “1. Order the service provider to collect, extract or record data related to a user, as well as data traffic in real time, through the application of technological measures” and to “12. Carry out the intervention or interception of telecommunications in real time, according to the procedure established in Article 62 of Law No. 735.”
Taken together, these articles represent an invasion of privacy, as they give the authorities the power to intercept communications and have access to information on them. Although privacy is a right that is relative, but not absolute, international human rights standards establish the possible infringement of privacy only if four elements are met[27] in a limited way:
[…]there are four essential criteria that any infringement of privacy must meet to be legitimate, namely: (a) arbitrary and must be provided for by law; (b) for any purpose but for one which is necessary in a democratic society; (c) for any purpose except for those of “national security or public safety, public order, the protection of public health or morals or the protection of the rights and freedoms of others;” and, (d) the measure must be proportionate to the threat or risk being managed. (Human Rights Council, 2019, p.6.)
Although this legislation establishes the need for judicial authorization for surveillance, it does not establish clear criteria that account for the proportionality of the infringement of the right, nor a legitimate democratic interest. On the contrary, this law has been used to sustain a regime that has undermined democracy in the country.
Since 2013, international mandates have stated that there is a need to limit surveillance programs. Also, they have emphasized that the effects of indiscriminate access to data on people’s communication are intimidating and limit the exercise of human rights such as free expression. Surveillance measures, therefore, should be “only in the most exceptional circumstances defined in the legislation,”[28] something that is not clear in this law.
Abuses and violations reported
The digital sphere has become an extension of the situation of rights violations in Nicaragua. On the one hand, journalists, civil society organizations, collectives and activists have found in this space a means to promote access to information for citizens, even in exile. On the other hand, the government has found ways to control public opinion and the population. The following are some of the tendencies that have been identified in this subject.
Access to the Internet and Internet disruptions
According to SRFOE, in Nicaragua there are no official statistics or indicators that measure Internet access since 2017[29]. This implies that there is no parameter for measuring the Internet access gap in the country, which is indicative of a lack of government interest in reducing it. Nevertheless, some studies have attempted to estimate it. The University of Washington created an indicator based on sources from the International Telecommunications Union (ITU), which states that in 2015, 19.7% of Nicaragua’s population was connected to the Internet[30], compared to 54.5% at the regional level. By 2022, the percentage reached 45.2% of the connected population in Nicaragua, while the average in Latin America rose to 73.3%[31].
In addition, the same study indicates that 14.0% of households in Nicaragua had Internet in 2015, compared to 30.1% in 2022. Meanwhile, in Latin America the average number of connected households was 42.6% in 2015 and 65.3% in 2022. The figures allow us to identify a percentage increase in Internet access by the population and in households. However, the country is below the regional average, which means a gap, not only in terms of access to the network, but also in terms of the rights that the population can enjoy through it.
Now then, in the context of the 2018 protests, the government of Daniel Ortega attempted to restrict freedom of expression online by interrupting Internet services. According to civil society organizations, during the demonstrations, at least 36 interruptions to Internet service were registered, which did not last more than one day. In addition, Wi-Fi signals were blocked[32]. This continued even after the protests had ended, as the government blocked Wi-Fi signals in public spaces[33]. The actions converge in international tendencies of blocking the Internet at times of large protests to prevent the spread of news about the disproportionate use of state force against the population.
As recognized by the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), Internet access disruptions aim to “limit the ability of a large number of people to use online communications tools, either by restricting Internet connectivity at large or by obstructing the accessibility and usability of services that are necessary for interactive communications, such as social media and messaging services.”[34] General Comment No. 37 (CCPR/C/GC/37) on the right to peaceful assembly (article 21 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights) recognizes that “States parties must not, for example, block or hinder Internet connectivity in relation to peaceful assemblies” and that “Any restrictions on the operation of information dissemination systems must conform with the tests for restrictions on freedom of expression.”
As a consequence of the blocking of the Internet, the rights of freedom of expression and access to information are limited, as well as other rights that are collaterally affected, such as freedom of association, the right to education or health.
Criminalization of online expression
In addition to the restriction of Internet access, the violation of free speech has been institutionalized by the Special Cybercrime Law, which came into force in December 2020. Among other matters, this legislation includes a whole new criminal statute on online expression. In its Article 30, it establishes the crime of propagating false news through information and communication technologies (ICT), punishable with between three and five years of imprisonment. However, the legislation does not contemplate concrete definitions of what is considered false news and its concepts are vague, as there is no way, for example, to recognize when a person intends to share a news item with harmful motives and when it was a mistake.
According to SRFOE, at least 30 people have been arrested and prosecuted for this crime[35], in addition to other offenses, such as undermining sovereignty and autonomy, resulting in longer sentences.
The legislation is contrary to international guidelines on freedom of expression. In 2017, international mandates stated in the Joint Declaration on Freedom of Expression and “Fake News”, Disinformation and Propaganda[36] that “prohibitions on fake news are incompatible with international standards for restrictions on freedom of expression, […] and should be abolished.” The same Declaration rejects the existence of laws that imply criminal actions against journalists, as they are disproportionate restrictions on the exercise of this right.
In the context of the pandemic, the Cybercrime Law was an instrument of threat and censorship for medical personnel who expressed critical opinions about the management of the crisis. In the 2021 report, the Special Rapporteur for Freedom of Expression of the IACHR, Pedro Vaca, included the case of the president of the Nicaraguan Medical Unit, José Antonio Vásquez, and the pulmonologist Jorge Miranda, who were summoned to a hearing to warn them that if they continued to express their opinions in public media about the government’s actions in the pandemic, they would incur in crimes under the Law[37]. These threats generated an effect of self-censorship in the medical personnel, since, in fear of being condemned, they limited their public opinions.
In court, the evidence presented is often content published on social networks and, in the case of journalists, press releases[38]. Faced with the risk of being condemned by the Cybercrime Law and given the need to continue informing the public, two tendencies have emerged. The first is that, given the closure, raid of offices or suspension of permissions, traditional media outlets have had to go into exile and opt to create digital media that allow them to inform without being at imminent risk[39].
In some cases, the mere threat of law enforcement, coupled with surveillance and harassment by police personnel, has motivated exile[40]. The second is that activists and journalists are creating accounts on social networks under pseudonyms so as not to be easily identified, which, although it has been perceived as a form of self-censorship, is also a way to continue expressing criticism of the government from anonymity[41].
Other forms of direct intervention in online public dialogues
One of the ways in which the Nicaraguan government manipulated public opinion, from the 2018 protests to the election period, was with a troll farm strategy, which meant the creation of a series of fake accounts on social networks such as Facebook, Twitter, Tik Tok, Telegram, among others. These accounts disseminated pro-government hashtags, amplifying the visibility of the government narrative in online spaces. In its report, SRFOE notes that Facebook deleted more than a thousand accounts related to these farms, as this action violates the platform’s community rules. In addition, Facebook disclosed that these accounts were operated from institutions such as the Nicaraguan Institute of Telecommunications and Post (TELCOR), the Supreme Court of Justice and the Nicaraguan Institute of Social Security[42].
Communications surveillance
An investigation by the Fake Antenna Detection Project (FADe Project) and South Lighthouse identified at least 39 IMSI-Catcher devices operating in Nicaragua. These are “fake antennas” that enable surveillance by intercepting data traffic from mobile devices. Of the 39 devices, 23 fake antennas correspond to the 2G network, mainly in Managua and four other areas of the country, and 16 are connected to the 4G network, also in Managua[43]. This study showed that the ICT infrastructure in Nicaragua is compromised and is being used to collect information from citizens.
This collection of data and information is dangerous in a context of constant repression. Fake antennas have the ability to intercept calls, text messages and to know their content and origin, as well as the content of each phone’s SIM card. Although it has not been verified that these devices were placed and operated by military forces, police or government authorities, their purpose is surveillance[44].
According to the Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and Protection of the Right to Freedom of Opinion and Expression, surveillance practices not only imply a violation of the right to privacy and intimacy, but also have repercussions on other rights. It is an abusive measure against the population. The Rapporteurship also emphasized that the States currently have greater capacity to implement surveillance systems at lower costs, which facilitates the arbitrary surveillance of individuals, who are often unaware that they are being watched[45].
In the Joint Declaration on “surveillance programs and their impact on freedom of expression,”[46] the international mandates established that indiscriminate access to data on people’s communications is of concern because it has intimidating effects and impacts on the search for and dissemination of information and, therefore, on access to information. The same Declaration emphasizes that “The State has the obligation to divulge information regarding the existence of illegal programs of surveillance of private communications broadly,” which has not happened in Nicaragua; on the contrary, it happens from the illegality and opacity. Likewise, human rights mandates state that service providers must inform users when there are requests for surveillance by the State.
Challenges of digital security faced by Nicaraguan media outlets
As has become clear throughout this text, journalists and media outlets in Nicaragua are at risk of being silenced, repressed, censored and arbitrarily detained for exercising their right to freedom of expression, press freedom and access to information.
Press freedom has been curtailed by the harassment and surveillance against journalists and their families. In some cases, they report the presence of armed men around their homes, directly threatening their safety[47]. In the same way, there have been raids on media offices, such as the case of the newspaper La Prensa, which opted to circulate only as a digital media[48]; after being raided, the Government dismantled its offices[49]. For this reason, journalists and media outlets have left the country, going into exile in countries such as Costa Rica and Panama and, in some cases, operating from abroad[50]. Due to this situation, it is estimated that from the beginning of the crisis until September 2022, about 160 journalists and communicators left Nicaragua[51].
The SRFOE of the IACHR has documented various attacks against the press and journalism in the country, including attempts to hack into Twitter, WhatsApp and other social media accounts. Likewise, media outlets and journalists have been victims of smear campaigns, unauthorized dissemination of their personal information and harassment by public officials and political party members through social networks[52].
A case that illustrates this type of attacks is that of the media Confidencial, which suffered a hacking of its WhatsApp account, used to send alerts to its audience about news and events happening in the country. The hacking occurred by accessing the text messages of the number registered in WhatsApp, so they were able to modify the verification key and access the account, sending sexual content to its audience[53]. The Confidencial has also been the victim of impersonation on its YouTube channel[54], as well as of at least two raids on its offices by the police and the disappearance of one of its staff photographers[55]. Therefore, these acts can be considered as a systematic persecution and harassment against a media outlet.
Final considerations
The Nicaraguan government, led by President Daniel Ortega, has plunged the country into a human rights crisis since 2018. The implementation of the government strategy to have political and public control has been sustained by the construction of regulatory frameworks favorable to arbitrariness. This legal framework facilitated in Nicaragua the criminalization of human rights such as free speech, freedom of association and privacy, limiting civic space, manipulating public opinion, encouraging self-censorship and exercising control over the population critical to the government.
In the digital environment, it is possible to detect a lack of interest on the part of the government in guaranteeing Internet access to the population. Paradoxically, digital technologies are part of the tools used by the government to maintain control in society. There is also a critical scenario on the excessive use of power in digital environments, thus achieving the criminalization of people who seek to publicize what is happening in the country through the Internet.
The measures adopted by Nicaragua reflect a worrying state of affairs regarding the use of technologies to consolidate authoritarian regimes. As the international human rights mandates of the United Nations and the Organization of American States have already stated, situations in which the rights to free expression and privacy may be restricted must be based on clear criteria of legitimacy, necessity and proportionality. In Nicaragua, though, we have seen the opposite, the legitimization of surveillance and the interception of communications through laws that institutionalize the violation of human rights.
Furthermore, it is worth mentioning that the precariousness and non-existence of public information, which should be generated by the authorities, has represented a challenge for this report and for other research conducted by multiple actors in the country. The work of independent media and civil society organizations should be highlighted, as they have made a valuable contribution to the construction of knowledge and access to public information, which has allowed other organizations and international bodies to learn about the reality of the country.
The Nicaraguan government has been known for the aggressiveness with which it acts and the control it effectively exercises over the population. This has led it to withdraw from international scrutiny and from international organizations that have tried to promote human rights in the country. As a result, it has become easier for the government to ignore the human rights recommendations made by these bodies, thereby dissociating itself from its responsibility in the international community.
From Derechos Digitales we call on the Nicaraguan authorities to act under a human rights framework in the implementation of digital technologies, as well as to modify the laws that currently threaten the exercise of rights in digital environments. We request authorization for the entry of international organizations in order to improve the living conditions of the population and to strengthen civic space, as well as to guarantee the exercise of freedom of expression, access to information and privacy, both in digital and non-digital environments.
September, 2023
An Spanish PDF version of this document is available here.
Credits
The report “Human rights in digital environments in Nicaragua” was conducted by the Derechos Digitales team, based on research by Mayra Osorio with input from Rafael Bonifaz, coordinated by Jamila Venturini, J. Carlos Lara and Michel Roberto de Souza. The text was revised and corrected by Vladimir Garay. The online version of the report was formatted and reviewed by Belén Roca, Ileana Silva and Vladimir Garay. The English version was translated by Gonzalo Bernabó.
Notes
[1] Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, Nicaragua: Concentration of Power and Weakening of the Rule of Law. Organization of American States, 2021 https://www.oas.org/en/iachr/reports/pdfs/2021_nicaragua-en.pdf
[2] Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, Gross human rights violations in the context of social protests in Nicaragua. Organization of American States, 2018. https://www.oas.org/en/iachr/reports/pdfs/Nicaragua2018-en.pdf
[3] Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, “Preliminary Observations on the IACHR Working Visit to Nicaragua.” Organization of American States, 2018. https://www.oas.org/en/iachr/media_center/PReleases/2018/113.asp (Accessed on June 16, 2023)
[4]Law No. 1040, Law on the Regulation of Foreign Agents. National Assembly of Nicaragua, 2020. http://legislacion.asamblea.gob.ni/normaweb.nsf/9e314815a08d4a6206257265005d21f9/3306286cd4e82c5f06258607005fdf6b
[5] Law No. 1115, General Law for the Regulation and Control of Non-Profit Organizations. National Assembly of Nicaragua, 2022. http://legislacion.asamblea.gob.ni/Normaweb.nsf/%28$All%29/F16E39766C5C7AFE062570A100577C41
[6] See: Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, “Nicaragua’s crackdown on civil society”. OHCHR statements. https://www.ohchr.org/en/statements/2022/05/nicaraguas-crackdown-civil-society (Accessed June 2, 2023) and See: Office of the Special Rapporteur for Freedom of Expression, ” In light of serious allegations regarding the closure of civic spaces in Nicaragua, UN and IACHR rapporteurs urge the authorities to comply with their international obligations to respect and guarantee fundamental freedoms”. SRFOE Press Releases.. https://www.oas.org/en/iachr/expression/showarticle.asp?artID=1257&lID=1 (Accessed June 02, 2023)
[7] Fundación del Río, Popol Na, Asociación Red Local y Esfera Ciudadana, La Brutal demolición de la Libertad de Asociación en Nicaragua: Violaciones al derecho de asociación bajo el régimen Ortega-Murillo (2007-2022). Nicaragua: Popol Na, 2022 https://popolna.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/12/Informe-Violaciones-Derecho-Asociacion-.pdf
[8] Law 1055, Law for the Defense of the People’s Rights to Independence, Sovereignty and Self-Determination for Peace. National Assembly of Nicaragua, 2020. http://legislacion.asamblea.gob.ni/SILEG/Iniciativas.nsf/C4084E2665A5610F06258642007E9C3F/$File/Ley%20N%C2%B0%201055,%20Ley%20Defensa%20de%20los%20Derechos%20del%20Pueblo.pdf?Open
[9] IACHR Requests from Inter-American Court of Human Rights Temporary Measures in Favor of 45 Individuals Held at 8 Detention Facilities in Nicaragua. IACHR Press Releases. https://www.oas.org/en/iachr/jsForm/?File=/en/iachr/media_center/preleases/2022/200.asp (Accessed June 16, 2023)
[10] Office of the Special Rapporteur for Freedom of Expression, Annual Report 2021. Report of the Office of the Special Rapporteur for Freedom of Expression. 2022. https://www.oas.org/en/iachr/expression/reports/IA2021ENG.pdf
[11] Nicas Libres Ya, “Cristiana Chamorro”. https://nicaslibresya.org/perfiles_pp/cristiana-chamorro/ (Accessed June 16, 2023)
[12] Nicas Libres Ya, “Miguel Mora”. https://nicaslibresya.org/perfiles_pp/miguel-mora-barberena/ (Accessed June 16, 2023)
[13] Human Rights Watch, World Report 2022: Nicaragua: Events of 2021. https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2022/country-chapters/nicaragua
[14] IACHR Requests from Inter-American Court of Human Rights Temporary Measures in Favor of 45 Individuals Held at 8 Detention Facilities in Nicaragua. IACHR Press Releases. https://www.oas.org/en/iachr/jsForm/?File=/en/iachr/media_center/preleases/2022/200.asp (Accessed June 16, 2023)
[15] See the stories of Lorenzo Holmann: https://cpj.org/es/2023/02/juan-lorenzo-holmann-de-la-prensa-me-di-la-vuelta-y-me-despedi-de-nicaragua/ and Miguel Mendoza: https://cpj.org/es/2023/02/periodista-nicaraguense-miguel-mendoza-sobre-su-deportacion-agridulce-de-su-pais-secuestrado/
[16] Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, “IACHR welcomes the release of political prisoners in Nicaragua but rejects arbitrary deprivation of nationality”. Press Releases. https://www.oas.org/en/iachr/jsForm/?File=/en/iachr/media_center/preleases/2023/021.asp (Accessed June 16, 2023).
[17] Law 1042, Special Cybercrime Law. National Assembly of Nicaragua, 2020. http://legislacion.asamblea.gob.ni/normaweb.nsf/($All)/803E7C7FBCF44D7706258611007C6D87
[18] See: Derechos Digitales and APC. When protection becomes threat: Cybercrime regulation as a tool for silencing women and LGBTQIA+ people around the world. Available at: https://www.apc.org/en/news/when-protection-becomes-threat-cybercrime-regulation-tool-silencing-women-and-lgbtqia-people
[19] Efe, La Prensa, Confidencial. “Nicaragua: amenazan con aplicar ley a médicos críticos”. Deutsche Welle. https://www.dw.com/es/nicaragua-amenazan-con-aplicar-ley-a-m%C3%A9dicos-cr%C3%ADticos/a-58605028 (Accessed June 16, 2023).
[20] AP, “Acoso y amenazas a médicos en Nicaragua por hablar del COVID.” La Nación https://www.lanacion.com.ar/agencias/acoso-y-amenazas-a-medicos-en-nicaragua-por-hablar-del-covid-nid13092021/ (Accessed June 17, 2023).
[21] Fundación del Río, Popol Na, Asociación Red Local y Esfera Ciudadana, La Brutal demolición de la Libertad de Asociación en Nicaragua: Violaciones al derecho de asociación bajo el régimen Ortega-Murillo (2007-2022). Nicaragua: Popol Na, 2022 https://popolna.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/12/Informe-Violaciones-Derecho-Asociacion-.pdf
[22]OEA, “Informe Nicaragua: Elecciones”. https://www.oas.org/fpdb/press/Informe-Nicaragua-Elecciones-2021.pdf
[23]Artículo 19, Special Cybercrime Bill in Nicaragua promotes censorship and criminalizes the everyday use of technologies. IFEX https://ifex.org/es/ley-especial-de-ciberdelitos-en-nicaragua-promueve-la-censura-y-la-criminalizacion-del-uso-cotidiano-de-las-tecnologias/ (Accessed June 17, 2023).
[24]Artículo 19, Special Cybercrime Bill in Nicaragua promotes censorship and criminalizes the everyday use of technologies. IFEX https://ifex.org/es/ley-especial-de-ciberdelitos-en-nicaragua-promueve-la-censura-y-la-criminalizacion-del-uso-cotidiano-de-las-tecnologias/ (Accessed June 17, 2023).
[25]Artículo 19, Special Cybercrime Bill in Nicaragua promotes censorship and criminalizes the everyday use of technologies. IFEX https://ifex.org/es/ley-especial-de-ciberdelitos-en-nicaragua-promueve-la-censura-y-la-criminalizacion-del-uso-cotidiano-de-las-tecnologias/ (Accessed June 17, 2023).
[26]Díaz, M. “Proyecto de ley especial de ciberdelitos en Nicaragua: una herramienta más para la represión del disenso”. Derechos Digitales. https://www.derechosdigitales.org/14881/proyecto-de-ley-especial-de-ciberdelitos-en-nicaragua-una-herramienta-mas-para-la-represion-del-disenso/
[27]Human Rights Council, “Right to privacy. Report of the Special Rapporteur on the right to privacy,” 2019, A/HRC/40/63.
[28] https://www.oas.org/en/iachr/expression/showarticle.asp?artID=926&lID=1
[29]Office of the Special Rapporteur for Freedom of Expression, Report of the Office of the Special Rapporteur for Freedom of Expression. 2023 https://www.oas.org/en/iachr/expression/reports/IA2022ENG.pdf
[30]According to the methodology implemented by the University of Washington, the population refers to “people who used the Internet in some way in any location for any purpose. Regardless of device.”
[31] DA2i Initiative, “DA2i Regional Reports” Connectivity data on Nicaragua. https://public.tableau.com/app/profile/da2i.reports/viz/DA2iRegionalReports/Introduction
[32]Association for Progressive Communications (APC) and Derechos Digitales, Internet shutdowns and human rights. 2022. https://www.derechosdigitales.org/wp-content/uploads/Internet_shutdowns_and_human_rights_ohchr_submission_2022-1.pdf. and Derechos Digitales. An overview of Internet shutdowns in Latin America [Una panorámica de los apagones de Internet en América Latina], 2023. https://www.derechosdigitales.org/wp-content/uploads/Shutdowns-panorama.pdf
[33] El Urbano, WiFi is blocked in Nicaraguan parks [“Bloquean WiFi en los parques de Nicaragua.”] El Urbano. https://elurbano.news/hemeroteca/bloquean-wifi-en-los-parques-de-nicaragua/ (Accessed June 17, 2023)
[34]Human Rights Council, “Internet shutdowns: Trends, Causes, Legal Implications and Impacts on a Range of Human Rights: Report of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights” 2022. A/HRC/50/55
[35]Office of the Special Rapporteur for Freedom of Expression, Report of the Office of the Special Rapporteur for Freedom of Expression. 2023 https://www.oas.org/en/iachr/expression/reports/IA2022ENG.pdf
[36] Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, Joint Declaration on Freedom of Expression and “Fake News”, Disinformation and Propaganda” Joint declarations. https://www.oas.org/en/iachr/expression/showarticle.asp?artID=1056&lID=1
[37] Office of the Special Rapporteur for Freedom of Expression, Annual Report 2021. Report of the Office of the Special Rapporteur for Freedom of Expression. 2022 https://www.oas.org/en/iachr/expression/reports/IA2021ENG.pdf
[38] Nicaragua Investiga, “Ortega intenta criminalizar las publicaciones en redes sociales, según expertos.” Nicaragua Investiga. https://nicaraguainvestiga.com/politica/59511-ortega-intenta-criminalizar-las-publicaciones-en-redes-sociales-segun-expertos/ (Accessed June 17, 2023)
[39] Hernández, D. “Radio Vos, de lo analógico a lo digital para luchar contra la dictadura nicaragüense.” VOCES https://voces.org.sv/radio-vos-de-lo-analogico-a-lo-digital-para-luchar-contra-la-dictadura-nicaraguense/ (Accessed June 17, 2023)
[40]A case that exemplifies this situation is that of Karelia de la Vega, known as Lady Vulgaraza, who since 2018 has carried out activism, denouncing human rights violations by the government of Daniel Ortega. Karelia was threatened and harassed by the Nicaraguan police, so she had to go into exile in Costa Rica and later in the United States. See more details at: https://www.derechosdigitales.org/21876/cuando-la-proteccion-se-transforma-en-amenaza-normativas-contra-los-ciberdelitos-como-herramientas-para-silenciar-mujeres-y-personas-lgbtqia-alrededor-del-mundo/
[41] Nicaragua Investiga, “Ortega intenta criminalizar las publicaciones en redes sociales, según expertos.” Nicaragua Investiga. https://nicaraguainvestiga.com/politica/59511-ortega-intenta-criminalizar-las-publicaciones-en-redes-sociales-segun-expertos/ (Accessed June 17, 2023)
[42] Office of the Special Rapporteur for Freedom of Expression, Annual Report 2021. Report of the Office of the Special Rapporteur for Freedom of Expression. 2022 https://www.oas.org/en/iachr/expression/reports/IA2021ENG.pdf
[43] Confidencial, “Descubren 39 “antenas falsas” que “vigilan” celulares en Nicaragua.” Confidencial. https://www.confidencial.digital/nacion/descubren-39-antenas-falsas-que-vigilan-celulares-en-nicaragua/ (Accessed June 17, 2023)
[44]R3D, “Torres falsas de telefonía vigilan a la ciudadanía en Nicaragua.” R3D. https://r3d.mx/2022/10/27/torres-falsas-de-telefonia-vigilan-a-la-ciudadania-en-nicaragua/ (Accessed June 17, 2023)
[45]Report of the Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of the right to freedom of opinion and expression, Frank La Rue”. 2013. A/HRC/23/40
[46]Special Rapporteurship for Freedom of Expression, Joint Declaration on “surveillance programs and their impact on freedom of expression”. 2013. https://www.oas.org/en/iachr/expression/showarticle.asp?artID=926&lID=1
[47] IPYS, “Journalists persecuted, no rights in Nicaragua, Cuba and Venezuela.” IFEX. https://ifex.org/es/periodistas-perseguidos-y-sin-derechos-en-nicaragua-cuba-y-venezuela/ (Accessed June 17, 2023)
[48] IPYS, “Journalists persecuted, no rights in Nicaragua, Cuba and Venezuela.” IFEX. https://ifex.org/es/periodistas-perseguidos-y-sin-derechos-en-nicaragua-cuba-y-venezuela/ (Accessed June 17, 2023)
[49]Martí Noticias, “Nicaragua: Ortega ordena “desmantelar” edificio del periódico La Prensa” https://www.martinoticias.com/a/nicaragua-ortega-ordena-desmantelar-edificio-del-peri%C3%B3dico-la-prensa/332449.html (Accessed July 18, 2023)
[50]Human Rights Watch, World Report 2023: Nicaragua: Events of 2022. https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2023/country-chapters/nicaragua
[51] Voces del Sur, Informe sobre violaciones a la Libertad de Prensa. Nicaragua: Voces del Sur, 2022. https://vocesdelsurunidas.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/10/DOC-20221010-WA0004..pdf
[52]Office of the Special Rapporteur for Freedom of Expression, Report of the Office of the Special Rapporteur for Freedom of Expression. 2023 https://www.oas.org/en/iachr/expression/reports/IA2022ENG.pdf
[53]100% Noticias, “Cuenta WhatsApp de Confidencial, Bacanal Nica y Canal 10 fueron hackeadas.” 100% Noticias https://100noticias.com.ni/nacionales/112424-whatsapp-medios-comunicacion-nicaragua-hackeados/ (Accessed June 17, 2023)
[54]Confidencial, “Así fue el hackeo a nuestro canal de YouTube CONFIDENCIAL NICA.” Confidencial.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=G6To-SHRt8g (Accessed June 16, 2023)
[55]Higuera, S., “Nicaraguan police raid Confidencial’s newsroom for second time” Knight Center for Journalism in the Americas. https://latamjournalismreview.org/articles/nicaraguan-police-raid-confidencials-newsroom-for-second-time-and-take-cameraman-who-remains-missing/ (Accessed June 16, 2023)